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Traditionally the probabilistic ranking principle is used to rank the search results while the rank-
ing based on expected profits is used for paid placement of ads. These rankings try to maximize
the expected utilities based on the user click models. Recent empirical analysis on search engine
logs suggests a unified click models for both ranked ads and search results. The segregated view of
document and ad rankings does not consider this commonality. Further, the used model considers
parameters of (i) probability of the user abandoning browsing results (ii) perceived relevance of
result snippets. But how to consider them for improved ranking is unknown currently. In this
paper, we propose a generalized ranking function—namely Click Efficiency (CE)—for documents
and ads based on empirically proven user click models. The ranking considers parameters (i) and
(ii) above, optimal and has the same time complexity as sorting. To exploit its generality, we
examine the reduced forms of CE ranking under different assumptions enumerating a hierarchy
of ranking functions. Interestingly, some of the rankings in the hierarchy are currently used ad
and document ranking functions; while others suggest new rankings. Thus this hierarchy illus-
trates the relations between different rankings, as well as clarifies the underlying assumptions.
While optimality of ranking is sufficient for document ranking, applying CE ranking to ad auc-
tions requires an appropriate pricing mechanism. We incorporate a second price based pricing
mechanism with the proposed ranking. Our analysis proves several desirable properties including
revenue dominance over VCG for the same bid vector and existence of a Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies. The equilibrium is socially optimal, and revenue equivalent to the truthful VCG
equilibrium. As a result of its generality, the auction mechanism and the equilibrium reduces
to the current mechanisms including GSP and corresponding equilibria. Further, we relax the
independence assumption in CE ranking and analyze the diversity ranking problem. We show
that optimal diversity ranking is NP-Hard in general, and that a constant time approximation
algorithm is not likely.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: H.3.3 [Information Systems]: INFORMATION STOR-
AGE AND RETRIEVAL—Information Search and Retrieval
General Terms: Algorithms, Theory
Additional Key Words and Phrases: ad ranking, document ranking, diversity, unified ranking
1. INTRODUCTION
Search engines rank the results to maximize relevance of the top documents. On the
other hand, targeted ads are ranked to maximize the profit from clicks. In general,
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the users browse through ranked lists of results or ads from top to bottom either
clicking or skipping the results, or abandoning browsing the list due to impatience
or satiation. The goal of the ranking is to maximize the expected relevances (or
profits) of clicked results based on the click model of the users. The sort by relevance
ranking suggested by Probability Ranking Principle (PRP) is commonly used for
search results for decades [Robertson 1977; Gordon and Lenk 1991]. In contrast,
sorting by the expected profits calculated as the product of bid amount and Click
Through Rate (CTR) is popular for ranking ads [Richardson et al. 2007].
Recent click models suggest that the user click behaviors for both search results
and targeted ads are the same [Guo et al. 2009; Zhu et al. 2010]. Considering this
commonality, the only difference between the two ranking problems is the utilities
of entities ranked: for documents utility is the relevance and for the ads it is the
cost-per-click. This suggests the possibility of a unified ranking function for results
and ads. The current segregation of document and ad ranking as separate areas
does not consider this commonality. A unified approach can help to widen the
scope of the related research to these two areas, and enable applications of existing
ranking functions in one area to isomorphic problems in the other area as we will
show below.
In addition to the unified approach, the recent click models consider the following
parameters:
(1) Browsing Abandonment: The user may abandon browsing ranked list at
any point. The likelihood of abandonment may depend on the entities the user
has already seen [Zhu et al. 2010].
(2) Perceived Relevance: Perceived relevance is the user’s relevance assessment
viewing only the search snippet or ad impression. The decision to click or
not depends on the perceived relevance, not on the actual relevance of the
results [Yue et al. 2010; Clarke et al. 2007].
Though these parameters are part of the click models [Guo et al. 2009; Zhu et al.
2010] how to exploit these parameters to improve ranking is unknown. The cur-
rent document ranking is based on the simplifying assumption that the perceived
relevance is the same as the actual relevance of the document, and ignores the
browsing abandonment. The ad placement partially considers perceived relevance,
but ignores abandonment probabilities.
We propose a unified optimal ranking function—namely Click Efficiency (CE)—
based on a generalized click model of the user. CE is defined as the ratio of the
stand-alone utility generated by an entity to the sum of the abandonment probabil-
ity and click probability of that entity (abandonment probability is the probability
for the user to leave browsing the list after viewing the entity). The sum of the
abandonment and click probability may be viewed as the click probability consumed
by the entity. We derive the name Click Efficiency based on this view—similar to
the definition of the mechanical efficiency of a machine as the ratio of the output
to the input energy. We show that sorting in the descending order of CE of en-
tities guarantees optimum ranking utility. We do not make assumptions on the
utilities of the entities, which may be assessed relevance for documents or cost per
click (CPC) charged based on the auction for ads. On plugging in the appropriate
utilities—relevance for documents and CPC for the ads—the ranking specializes to
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document and ad ranking.
As an implication of the generality, the proposed ranking will reduce to specific
ranking problems on assumptions on the user behavior. We enumerate a hierar-
chy of ranking functions corresponding to the limiting assumptions on the click
model. Most interestingly, some of these special cases correspond to the currently
used document and ad ranking functions—including PRP and sort by expected
profit described above. Further, some of the reduced ranking functions suggest new
rankings for special cases of the click model—like a click model in which the user
never abandons the search, or the perceived relevance is approximated as the ac-
tual relevance. This hierarchy elucidates interconnection between different ranking
functions and the assumptions behind the rankings. We believe that this will help
in choosing the appropriate ranking function for a particular user click behavior.
Ad Ranking: An ad placement mechanism consists of a ranking and a pricing
strategy. Hence to apply the CE ranking to ad placement, a pricing mechanism
has to be associated. We incorporate a second price based pricing mechanism with
the proposed ranking. Our analysis establishes many interesting properties of the
proposed mechanism. Particularly, we state and prove the existence of a Nash
Equilibrium in pure strategies. At this equilibrium the profits of the search engine
and the total revenue of the advertisers is simultaneously optimized. Like ranking,
this is a generalized auction mechanism, and reduces to the existing GSP and
Overture mechanisms under the same assumptions as that of the ranking. Further,
the stated Nash Equilibrium is a general case of the equilibriums of these existing
mechanisms. Comparing the mechanism properties with that of VCG [Vickrey
1961; Clarke 1971; Groves 1973], we show that for the same bid vector search engine
revenue for the CE mechanism will be greater or equal to that of VCG. Further, the
revenue for the proposed equilibrium is equal to the revenue of truthful dominant
strategy equilibrium of VCG.
Diversity Ranking: Our analysis so far was based on the assumption of pa-
rameter independence between the ranked entities. We relax this assumption and
analyze the implications based on a specific well known problem—diversity rank-
ing [Carterette 2010; Agrawal et al. 2009; Rafiei et al. 2010]. Diversity ranking
try to maximize the collective utility of top-k ranked entities. For a ranked list,
an entity will reduce residual utility of a similar entity below in the list. Though
optimizing many of the specific ranking functions incorporating diversity is known
to be NP-Hard [Carterette 2010], an understanding of why this is an inherently
hard problem is lacking. By analyzing a significantly general case, we show that
even the very basic formulation of diversity ranking is NP-Hard. Further we extend
our proof showing that a constant ratio approximation algorithm is unlikely. As a
benefit of the generality of ranking, these results are applicable both for ads and
documents.
The contributions of the unified ranking, including both ad and document do-
mains are:
(1) Unified optimal ranking (CE ranking) based a generalized click model.
(2) Optimal ranking considering abandonment probabilities for documents and ads.
(3) Optimal Ranking considering perceived relevance of documents and ads.
(4) A unified hierarchy of ranking functions and enumerating optimal rankings for
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different click models.
(5) Analysis of general diversity ranking problem and hardness proofs.
Contributions to ad placement are:
(1) Design and analysis of a generalized ad auction mechanism incorporating pric-
ing with CE ranking.
(2) Proving existence of a socially optimal Nash Equilibrium with optimal adver-
tisers revenue as well as optimal search engine profit.
(3) Proof of search engine revenue dominance over VCG for equivalent bid vectors,
and equilibrium revenue equivalence to the truthful VCG equilibrium.
The rest of this paper is organized as following. Next section reviews related
work. Section 3 explains the click model used for our analysis. Subsequently we in-
troduce our optimal ranking function, and discuss the intuitions and implications.
In Section 5 reductions of ranking function to several document and ad ranking
functions under limiting assumptions are enumerated. Further we discuss several
useful special cases of our ranking and assumptions under which they are optimal.
In Section 6 we incorporate a pricing strategy to design a complete auction mech-
anism for ads. Several useful properties are established, including the existence of
Nash equilibrium and revenue dominance over VCG. Section 7 explores the ranking
considering mutual influences and proves our hardness results. Finally we conclude
by discussing potential future research.
2. RELATED WORK
The impact of click models on ranking has been analyzed in ad-placement. Bal-
akrishnan and Kambhampati [Balakrishnan and Kambhampati 2008] proposed the
optimal ad ranking considering mutual influences. The ranking uses the same user
model, but the paper considers only ads, and does not include generalization and ad
auction mechanisms. Aggarwal et al. [Aggarwal et al. 2008] as well as Kempe and
Mahdian [Kempe and Mahdian 2008] analyze placement of ads using a Markovian
click model. The click model is similar except for that the abandoning is not mod-
eled separately from continuing probability. These two papers optimize the sum of
the revenues of the advertisers, instead of the optimizing search engine profits as
we do for ads in this paper. Giotis and Karlin [Giotis and Karlin 2008] extend this
work by applying GSP pricing and analyzing the equilibrium. The GSP pricing and
ranking lacks the optimality and generality properties we prove in this paper. Deng
and Yu [Deng and Yu 2009] extend this work by suggesting a ranking and pricing
schema for the search engines and prove the existence of a Nash Equilibrium. The
ranking is a simpler bid based ranking (not based on CPC as in our case); and
mechanism as well as equilibrium do not show optimality properties we prove in
this paper. Kuminov and Tennenholtz [Kuminov and Tennenholtz 2009] proposed
a Pay Per Action (PPA) model similar to the click models and compared the equi-
librium of GSP mechanism on the model with the VCG. Ad auctions considering
influence of other ads on conversion rates are analyzed by Ghosh and Sayedi [Ghosh
and Sayedi 2010].
The existing document ranking based on PRP [Robertson 1977] claims that a
retrieval order sorted on relevance leads to the largest number of relevant documents
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Fig. 1. Flow graph for an user browsing the first two entities. The labels are the view probabilities
and ei denotes the entity at the i
th position
in a set than any other policy. Gordon and Lenk [Gordon and Lenk 1991; 1992]
identified the required assumptions for the optimality of the ranking according to
PRP. Our discussion on PRP may be considered as an independent formulation of
assumptions under which PRP is optimal for web ranking.
User behavior studies in click models validate the ranking function introduced.
There are a number of position based and cascade models studied recently [Dupret
and Piwowarski 2008; Craswell et al. 2008; Guo et al. 2009; Chapelle and Zhang
2009; Zhu et al. 2010]. In particular, General Click Model (GCM) by Zhu et al.[Zhu
et al. 2010] is interesting for us, since other click models are special cases of GCM.
Zhu et al. [Zhu et al. 2010] have listed assumptions under which the GCM would
reduce to other click models. We will discuss the relations of our model to GCM
below. Optimizing utilities of two dimensional placement of search results has been
studied by Chierichetti et al. [Chierichetti et al. 2011]
Along with the current click models, there has been research on evaluating per-
ceived relevance of the search snippets [Yue et al. 2010] and ad impressions [Clarke
et al. 2007]. Research in this direction neatly complements our new ranking function
by estimating the parameters required.
Diversity ranking has received considerable attention recently [Agrawal et al.
2009; Rafiei et al. 2010]. The objective functions used to measure diversity by prior
works are known to be NP-Hard [Carterette 2010].
3. CLICK MODEL
We assume a basic user click model in which the web user browses the entity list
in ranked order, as shown in Figure 1. At every result entity, the user may:
(1) Click the result entity with perceived relevance C(e). We define the perceived
relevance as the probability to click the entity ei having seen ei i.e. C(ei) =
P (click(ei)|view(ei)). Note that Click Through Rate (CTR) defined in ad
placement is the same as the perceived relevance defined here [Richardson et al.
2007].
(2) Abandon browsing the result list with abandonment probability γ(ei). γ(ei) is
defined as the probability of abandoning the search at ei having seen ei. i.e.
γ(ei) = P (abandonment(ei)|view(ei)).
(3) Go to the next entity in the result list with probability
[
1− (C(ei) + γ(ei))]
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The click model can be schematically represented as the flow graph shown in
Figure 1. Labels on the edges refer to the probability of the user traversing them.
Each vertex in the figure corresponds to a view epoch (see below), and the flow
balance holds at each vertex. Starting from the top entity, the probability of the
user clicking the first ad is R(e1) and probability of him abandoning browsing is
γ(e1). The user goes beyond the first entity with probability 1 − (R(e1) + γ(e1))
and so on for the subsequent results.
In this model, we assume that the parameters—C(ei), γ(ei) and U(ei)—are func-
tions of the entity at the current position i.e. these parameters are independent of
other entities the user has already seen. We recognize that this assumption is not
fully accurate, since the users decision to click the current item or leave search may
depend on not just on the current item but rather all the items he has seen before
in the list. We stick to the assumption for the optimal ranking analysis below,
since considering mutual influence of ads can lead to combinatorial optimization
problems with intractable solutions. We will show that even the simplest depen-
dence between the parameters will indeed lead to intractable optimal ranking in
Section 7.
Though the proposed model is intuitive enough, we would like to mention that
the our model is confirmed by the recent empirical click models. For example, the
General Click Model (GCM) by Zhu et al. [Zhu et al. 2010] is based on the same
basic user behavior. The GCM is empirically validated for both search results and
ads [Zhu et al. 2010]. Further, other click models are shown to be special cases of
GCM (hence special cases of the model used in this paper). Please refer to Zhu
et al. [Zhu et al. 2010] for a detailed discussion. These previous works avoids the
need for separate model validation, as well as confirms feasibility of the parameter
estimation.
4. OPTIMAL RANKING
Based on the click model, we formally define the ranking problem and derive optimal
ranking in this section. The formal problem statement is,
Choose the optimal ranking Eopt = 〈e1, e2, .., eN 〉 of N entities to maximize the
expected utility
E(U) =
N∑
i=1
U(ei)Pc(ei) (1)
where N is the total number of entities to be ranked.
For the browsing model in Figure 1, the click probability for the entity at the ith
position is,
Pc(ei) = C(ei)
i−1∏
j=1
[
1− (C(ej) + γ(ej))] (2)
Substituting click probability Pc from Equation 2 in Equation 1 we get,
E(U) =
N∑
i=1
U(ei)C(ei)
i−1∏
j=1
[1− (C(ej) + γ(ej))] (3)
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The optimal ranking maximizing this expected utility can be shown to be a
sorting problem with a simple ranking function:
Theorem 1. The expected utility in Equation 3 is maximum if the entities are
placed in the descending order of the value of the ranking function CE,
CE(ei) =
U(ei)C(ei)
C(ei) + γ(ei)
(4)
Proof Sketch: The proof shows that any inversion in this order will reduce the
expected profit. CE function is deduced from expected profits of two placements—
the CE ranked placement and placement in which the order of two adjacent ads
are inverted. We show that the expected profit from the inverted placement can
be no greater that the CE ranked placement. Please refer to Appendix A-1 for the
complete proof. 2
As mentioned in the introduction, the ranking function CE is the utility gener-
ated per unit view probability consumed by the entity. With respect to browsing
model in Figure 1, the top entities in the ranked list have higher view probabil-
ities, and placing ads with greater utility per consumed view probability higher
intuitively increases total utilities.
Note that the ordering above does not maximize the utility for selecting a sub-
set of items. The seemingly intuitive method of ranking the set of items by CE
and selecting top-k may not be optimal [Aggarwal et al. 2008]. For optimal se-
lection, the proposed ranking can be extended by a dynamic programming based
selection—similar to the method suggested by Aggrawal et al [Aggarwal et al. 2008]
for maximizing advertiser’s profit. In this paper, we discuss only the ranking prob-
lem.
5. RANKING TAXONOMY
As we mentioned before, the CE ranking will be applicable to different ranking
problems by plugging in corresponding utilities. For example, if we plug in relevance
as utility (U(e) in Equation 4), the ranking function is for the documents, whereas
if we plug in cost per click of ads, the ranking function is for ads. Further, we
may assume specific constraints on one or more of the three parameters of CE
ranking (e.g. ∀iγ(ei) = 0). On these assumptions, CE ranking will suggest number
of reduced ranking functions with specific applications. These substitutions and
reductions can be enumerated as a taxonomy of ranking functions.
We show the taxonomy in Figure 2. The three top branches of the taxonomy
(U(e) = R(d), U(e) = $(a), and U(e) = v(a) branches) are document, ad ranking
maximizing search engine profit, and ad ranking maximizing advertisers revenue
respectively. These branches correspond to the substitution of utilities by document
relevance, CPC, and private value of the advertisers. The sub-trees below these
branches are the further reduced cases of these three main categories. The solid
lines in Figure 2 denote already known functions, while the dotted lines are the
new ranking functions suggested by CE ranking. Sections 5.1, Section 5.2, and
Section 5.3 below discuss the further reductions of document ranking, search engine
optimal ad ranking, and social optimal ad ranking respectively.
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Fig. 2. Taxonomy reduced ranking functions of CE . The assumptions and corre-
sponding reduced ranking functions are illustrated. The dotted lines denote pre-
dicted ranking functions incorporating new click model parameters.
5.1 Document Ranking
For the document ranking the utility of ranking is the probability of relevance of the
document. Hence by substituting the document relevance—denoted by R(d)—in
Equation 4 we get
CE(d) =
C(d)R(d)
C(d) + γ(d)
(5)
This function suggests the general optimal relevance ranking for the documents.
We discuss some intuitively valid assumptions on user model for the document
ranking and the corresponding ranking functions below. The three assumptions
discussed below correspond to the three branches under Document Ranking subtree
in Figure 2.
Sort by Relevance (PRP): We elucidate two sets of assumptions under which
the CE(d) in Equation 5 will reduce to PRP.
First assume that the user has infinite patience, and never abandons results (i.e.
γ(d) ≈ 0). Substituting this assumption in Equation 5,
CE(d) ≈ R(d)C(d)
C(d)
= R(d) (6)
which is exactly the ranking suggested by PRP.
In other words, scenarios in which the user has infinite patience and never aban-
dons checking the results (i.e. the user leaves browsing the results only by clicking
a result) the PRP is still optimal.
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Second set of slightly weaker assumptions under which the CE(d) will reduce to
PRP is
(1) C(d) ≈ R(d).
(2) Abandonment probability γ(d) is negatively proportional to the document rel-
evance i.e. γ(d) ≈ k −R(d), where k is a constant between one and zero. This
assumption corresponds to the intuition that the higher the perceived relevance
of the current result, the less likely is the user to abandon the search.
Now the CE(d) reduces to,
CE(d) ≈ R(d)
2
k
(7)
Since this function is strictly increasing with R(d), ordering by R(d) results in the
same ranking as suggested by the function. This implies that PRP is optimal under
these assumptions also.
Abandonment decreasing with perceived relevance is a more intuitively valid
assumption than the infinite patience assumption above.
Ranking Considering Perceived Relevance: Recently click log studies effec-
tively assesses perceived relevance of document search snippets [Yue et al. 2010;
Clarke et al. 2007]. But how to use the perceived relevance for improved docu-
ment ranking is unknown. We show that depending on the nature of abandonment
probability γ(d), the optimal ranking considering perceived relevance differs.
If we assume that γ(d) ≈ 0 in Equation 5, the optimal perceived relevance ranking
is the same as that suggested by PRP as we have seen in Equation 6.
On the other hand, if we assume that the abandonment probability is negatively
proportional to the perceived relevance (γ(d) = k − C(d)) as above, the optimal
ranking considering perceived relevance is
CE(d) ≈ C(d)R(d)
k
∝ C(d)R(d) (8)
i.e. sorting in the order of product of document relevance and perceived relevance
is optimal under these assumptions. The assumption of abandonment probabil-
ities negatively proportional to relevance is more realistic than infinite patience
assumption as we discussed above. This discussion shows that by estimating na-
ture of abandonment probability, one would be able to decide on optimal perceived
relevance ranking.
Ranking Considering Abandonment: We consider the ranking considering
abandonment probability γ(d), with the assumption that the perceived relevance
is approximately equal to the actual relevance. In this case the CE(d) becomes,
CE(d) ≈ R(d)
2
R(d) + γ(d)
(9)
Clearly this is not a strictly increasing function with R(d). This means that ranking
considering abandonment is different from PRP ranking, even if we assume that
the perceived relevance is equal to the actual relevance. On the assumption that
∀dγ(d) = 0, the abandonment ranking becomes same as PRP.
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5.2 Optimal Ad Ranking for Search Engines
For the paid placement of ads, the utility of ads to the search engine are Cost Per
Click (CPC) of ads. Hence, by substituting the CPC of the ad—denoted by P (a)—
in Equation 4 we get
CE(a) =
C(a)P (a)
C(a) + γ(a)
(10)
Thus this function suggests the general optimal ranking for the ads. Please recall
that the perceived relevance C(a) is the same as the Click Through Rate (CTR)
used for ad placement [Richardson et al. 2007].
In the following subsections demonstrate how the general ranking presented re-
duces to the currently used ad placement strategies under appropriate assumptions.
We will show that they all correspond to the specific assumptions on the abandon-
ment probability γ(a). These two functions below correspond to the two branches
under the SE Optimal ad Placement subtree in Figure 2.
Ranking by Bid Amount: The sort by bid amount ranking was used by Over-
ture Services (and was later used by Yahoo! for a while after their acquisition of
Overture). Assuming that the user never abandons browsing (i.e. ∀aγ(a) = 0),
Equation 10 reduces to
CE(a) = P (a) (11)
This means that the ads are ranked purely in terms of their payment1.
When γ(a) = 0, we essentially have a user with infinite patience who will keep
browsing downwards until he finds the relevant ad. So, to maximize profit, it makes
perfect sense to rank ads by bid amount. More generally, for small abandonment
probabilities, ranking by bid amount is near optimal. Note that this ranking is
isomorphic to PRP ranking discussed above for document ranking, since both are
ranking based only on utilities.
Ranking by Expected Profit: Google and Microsoft are purported to be placing
the ads in the order of expected profit based on product of CTR (C(a) in CE)
and bid amount (P (a)) [Richardson et al. 2006]. The ranking is part of the well
known Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction mechanism. If we approximate
abandonment probability as negatively proportional to the CTR of the ad (i.e.
∀aγ(a) = k − C(a)) , the Equation 10 reduces to,
CE(a) ≈ P (a)R(a)
k
∝ P (a)R(a) (12)
This shows that ranking ads by their stand-alone expected profit is near optimal as
long as the abandonment probability is negatively proportional to the relevance.2
Note that this ranking is isomorphic to the perceived relevance ranking of the
documents discussed above.
1Overture ranking is by bid amount, which is different from payment in a second price auction
(since payment will be next higher bid amount). But both will result in the same ranking.
2Google mechanism—GSP—uses bid amount of the advertisers (instead of CPC in Equation 12)
for ranking. We will show that both will result in the same ranking by an order preserving property
of the GSP pricing in Section 6.
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5.3 Revenue Optimal Ad Ranking
An important property of the auction mechanism is the expected revenue—which is
the sum of the profits of the advertisers and search engine. To analyze advertisers
profit, a private value model is commonly used. Each advertiser is assigned with
a private value for the click equal to the expected revenue from the click. Adver-
tisers pay a fraction of this revenue to the search engine depending on the pricing
mechanism. The profit for advertisers is the difference between the private value
and payment to the search engine. The profit for the search engine is the payment
of the advertisers. Consequently, the revenue is the sum of the profits of all the
parties—search engine and the advertisers.
The Advertiser Social Optima branch in Figure 2 corresponds to the ranking to
maximize total revenue. Private value of advertisers ai is denoted as—v(ai). By
substituting the utility by private values in Equation 4 we get,
CE(d) =
C(a)v(a)
C(a) + γ(a)
(13)
If the ads are ranked in this order, the ranking will guarantee maximum revenue.
This result is already known, as Agarwal et al. [Aggarwal et al. 2008] and Kempe
and Mahdian [Kempe and Mahdian 2008] independently analyzed the auctions to
maximize advertiser revenue and proposed similar ranking function.
In Figure 2 the two left branches of revenue maximizing subtree (labeled γ(a) = 0
and γ(a) = k−C(a)) correspond to the assumption of no abandonment, and aban-
donment probabilities negatively proportional to the click probability respectively.
These two cases are isomorphic to the Overture and Google ranking discussed in
Section 5.2 above. We discuss further on revenue maximizing ranking in conjunc-
tion with a pricing mechanism in Section 6
6. APPLYING CE RANKING FOR AD PLACEMENT
We have shown that CE ranking maximizes the profits for search engines for given
CPCs in Section 5.2. In ad placement, the net profits of ranking to the search
engine can only be analyzed in association with a pricing mechanism. To this end,
we introduce a pricing to be used with the CE designing a full auction mechanism.
Subsequently, we analyze the properties of the mechanism.
To describe the dynamics of ad auctions briefly, the search engine decides the
ranking and pricing (cost per click) of the ads based on the bid amounts of the
advertisers. Generally the pricing is not equal to the bid amount of advertisers, but
is instead derived based on the bids [Easley and Kleinberg 2010; Edelman et al.
2005; Aggarwal et al. 2006]. In response to these ranking and pricing strategies,
the advertisers (more commonly, the software agents of the advertisers) may change
their bids to maximize their profits. They may change bids hundreds of times a
day. Eventually, the bids will stabilize at a fixed point where no advertiser can
increase his profit by unilaterally changing his bid. This set of bids corresponds
to a Nash Equilibrium of the auction mechanism. Hence the realistic profits of a
search engine will be the profits corresponding to the Nash Equilibrium.
The next section discusses the properties of any mechanism based on the user
model in Figure 1—independent of the ranking and pricing strategies. In Sec-
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tion 6.2, we introduce a pricing mechanism and analyze its properties including the
equilibrium.
6.1 Pricing Independent Properties
In this section we illustrate properties arising based on the user browsing model in
Figure 1, not assuming any pricing or ranking strategy. One of the basic results is
Remark 1. In any equilibrium the payment by the advertisers is less than or
equal to their private values (i.e. individual rationality of the bidders is maintained).
If this is not true, advertiser may opt out from the auction by bidding zero and
increase the profit, violating the assumption of an equilibrium.
Remark 2. In any equilibrium, price paid by an advertiser increases monoton-
ically as he moves up in the ranking unilaterally.
From the browsing model, click probability of the advertisers in non-decreasing as
he moves up in the position. Unless the price increases monotonically, advertiser
can increase his profit by moving up, violating the assumption of an equilibrium.
Note that the proposed model is a general case of the positional auctions model
by Varian [Varian 2007]. Positional auctions assume static click probabilities for
each position independent of the other ads. We assume realistic dynamic click
probabilities depending on the ads above. Due to these externalities, the model is
more complex and does not hold many of the properties derived by Varian [Varian
2007] (e.g. monotonically increasing values and prices with positions).
Remark 3. Irrespective of the ranking and pricing, the sum of revenues of the
advertisers is upper bounded at
E(V ) =
N∑
i=1
v(ai)C(ai)
i−1∏
j=1
[1− (C(aj) + γ(aj))] (14)
when the advertisers are ordered by C(a)v(a)C(a)+γ(a) . Further, this is an upper bound for
the search engine profit.
This result directly follows from the Advertisers Social Optima branch in Figure 2,
and Equation 13.
The revenue is shared among the advertisers and search engine. For each click,
advertisers get a revenue equal to the private value v(a) and pay a fraction equal
to the CPC (set by the search engine pricing strategy) to the search engine. The
total payoff for the search engine is the sum of the payments by the advertisers.
Conversely, total payoff to the advertisers is the difference between total revenue
and payoff to the search engine. Since the suggested order above in Remark 3
maximizes revenue, which is the sum of the payoffs of all the players (search engine
and the advertisers), this is a socially optimal order and the revenue realized is the
socially optimal revenue.
A corollary of the social optimality combined with the individual rationality
result in Remark 1 is that,
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Remark 4. The quantity E(V ) in Remark 3 is an upper bound for the search
engine profit irrespective of the ranking and pricing mechanism.
Social optimal revenue can be realized only if the ads are in the descending order
of C(a)v(a)C(a)+γ(a) . Social optimum is desirable for search engines, since this will increase
the payoffs for advertisers for the same CPC. Increased payoffs will increase the
advertiser’s incentive to advertise with the search engine and will increase business
for the search engine in long term.
Since search engines do not know the private value of the advertisers (note that
search engine perform the ranking), social optimal ranking based on private values
is not directly feasible. We need to design a mechanism having an equilibrium
coinciding with the social optimality. This will motivate advertisers towards bids
coinciding with social optimal ordering. In addition to social optimality, it is highly
desirable for the mechanism to be based on CE ranking to simultaneously maximize
advertiser’s revenue and search engine profit. In the following section we propose
such a mechanism using CE ranking and prove the existence of an equilibrium in
which the CE ranking coincides with the social optimal allocation.
6.2 Pricing and Equilibrium
In this section, we define a pricing strategy to use with the CE ranking, and analyze
properties of the resulting mechanism.
For defining the pricing strategy, we define the pricing order as the decreasing
order of w(a)b(a), where w(a) is,
w(a) =
C(a)
C(a) + γ(a)
(15)
In this pricing order, we denote the ith advertiser’s w(ai) as wi, C(ai) as ci, b(ai)
as bi, and abandonment probability γ(ai) as γi for convenience. Let µi = ci + γi.
For each click advertiser ai is charged with a price pi (CPC) equal to the minimum
bid required to maintain its position in the pricing order,
pi =
wi+1bi+1
wi
=
bi+1ci+1µi
µi+1ci
(16)
Substituting pi in Equation 10 for the ranking order, CE of the i
th advertiser is,
CEi =
pici
µi
(17)
This proposed mechanism preserves the pricing order in the ranking order as
well, i.e.
Theorem 2. The order by wibi is the same as the order by CEi for the auction
i.e.
wibi ≥ wjbj ⇐⇒ CEi ≥ CEj (18)
Proof is given in the Appendix A-2. This order preservation property implies that
the final ranking is the same as that based on bid amounts. As a corollary, the
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CPC is equal to the minimum amount the advertisers have to pay to maintain his
position in the ranking order as well.
Further we show below that any advertisers CPC is less or equal to his bid.
Lemma 1 (Individual Rationality). The payment pi of any advertiser is
less or equal to his bid amount.
Proof.
pi =
bi+1ci+1µi
µi+1ci
=
bi+1ci+1
µi+1
µi
cibi
bi ≤ bi(since CEi ≥ CEi+1)
This means advertisers will never have to pay more than bid, similar to GSP. This
nice property makes it easy for the advertiser to decide his bid.
Interestingly, this mechanism also is a general case of the existing mechanisms,
as in the case of CE ranking. In particular, the mechanism reduces to GSP (Google
mechanism) and Overture mechanisms on the same assumptions on which CE rank-
ing reduces to respective rankings (described in Section 5.2).
Lemma 2. The mechanism reduces to Overture ranking with second price auction
on the assumption ∀iγi = 0
Proof. This assumption implies
wi = 1
⇒ pi = bi+1 (second price auction)
⇒ CEi = bi+1 ≡ bi (as ranking is the the same)
Lemma 3. The mechanism reduces to GSP on assumption ∀iγi = k − ci
Proof. This assumption implies
wi = ci
⇒ pi = bi+1ci+1
ci
(GSP pricing)
⇒ CEi = bi+1ci+1
k
≡ bici
k
(by Theorem 2)
∝ bici
This in conjunction with Theorem 2 implies that GSP ranking by cibi (i.e. by
bids) is the same as the ranking by cipi (by CPCs).
Now we will look at the equilibrium properties of the mechanism. Truth telling
is not a dominant strategy. This trivially follows, since GSP is a special case of the
proposed mechanism, and it is known that for GSP truth telling is not a dominant
strategy [Edelman et al. 2005]. Hence we center our analysis on Nash Equilibrium
conditions.
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Theorem 3 (Nash Equilibrium). Without the loss of generality assume that
the advertisers are ordered in the decreasing order of civiµi where vi is the private
value of the ith advertiser. The advertisers are in an envy free pure strategy Nash
Equilibrium if
bi =
µi
ci
[
vici + (1− µi)bi+1ci+1
µi+1
]
(19)
This equilibrium is socially optimal as well as optimal for search engines for the
given CPC’s.
Proof Sketch: The inductive proof shows that for these bid values, no advertiser
can increase his profit by moving up or down in the ranking. The full proof is given
in Appendix A-3. 2
We do not rule out the existence of multiple equilibria. The stated equilibrium is
particularly interesting, due to the simultaneous social optimality and search engine
optimality.
The following remarks show that equilibria of other placement mechanisms are
reduced cases of the proposed CE equilibrium, as a natural consequence of its
generality. The stated equilibrium reduces to equilibriums in Overture mechanism
and GSP under the same assumptions under which the ranking reduces to respective
rankings.
Remark 5. The bid values
bi = vici + (1− ci)bi+1 (20)
are a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in Overture mechanism. This corresponds to
the substitution of the assumption ∀iγi = 0 (i.e. µi = ci) in Theorem 3.
The proof follows from Theorem 3 as both pricing and ranking is shown to be a
special case of our proposed mechanism.
Similarly for GSP,
Remark 6. The bid values
bi = vik + (1− k)bi+1ci+1 (21)
is a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in GSP mechanism.
This equilibrium corresponds to the substitution of the assumption ∀iγi = k −
ci (1 ≥ k ≥ 0) in Theorem 3. Since this is a special case, the proof for Theorem 3
is sufficient.
6.3 Comparison with VCG mechanism
We compare the revenue and equilibrium of CE mechanism with those of VCG [Vick-
rey 1961; Clarke 1971; Groves 1973]. VCG auctions combine an optimal allocation
(ranking) with VCG pricing. VCG payment of a bidder is equal to the reduction of
revenues of other bidders due to the presence of the bidder. A well known property
is that VCG pricing with any socially optimal allocation has truth telling as the
the dominant strategy equilibrium.
In the context of online ads, ranking optimal with respect to the bid amounts is
socially optimal ranking for VCG. This optimal ranking is biciµi ; as directly implied
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by the Equation 1 on substituting bi for utilities. Hence this ranking combined with
VCG pricing has truth telling as the dominant strategy equilibrium. Since bi = vi
at the dominant strategy equilibrium, ranking is socially optimal for an advertiser’s
true value as suggested in Equation 13.
The CE ranking function is different from VCG since CE ranking by payments
optimizes search engine profits. On the other hand, VCG ranks by bids optimizing
advertiser’s profit. But the Theorem 2 shows that for the pricing used in CE, or-
dering of CE is the same as that of VCG. This order preserving property facilitates
comparison of CE with VCG. The theorem below shows revenue dominance of CE
over VCG for the same bid values of advertisers.
Theorem 4 (Search Engine Revenue Dominance). For the same bid val-
ues for all the advertisers, the revenue of search engine by CE mechanism is greater
or equal to the revenue by VCG.
Proof Sketch: The proof is an induction based on the fact that the ranking by CE
and VCG are the same, as mentioned above. Full proof is given in Appendix A-4.
2
This theorem shows that the CE mechanism is likely to provide higher revenue to
the search engine even during transient times before the bids settle on equilibriums.
Based on Theorem 4 we prove revenue equivalence of the proposed CE equilib-
rium with dominant strategy equilibrium of VCG.
Theorem 5 (Equilibrium Revenue Equivalence). At the equilibrium in The-
orem 3, the revenue of search engine is equal to the revenue of the truthful dominant
strategy equilibrium of VCG.
Proof Sketch: The proof is an inductive extension of the of Theorem 4. Please
see Appendix A-5 for complete proof. 2
Note that the CE equilibrium has lower bid values than VCG at the equilibrium,
but provides the same profit to the search engine.
7. CE RANKING CONSIDERING MUTUAL INFLUENCES: DIVERSITY RANKING
An assumption in CE ranking is that the entities are mutually independent as we
pointed out in Section 3. In other words, the three parameters—U(e), C(e) and
γ(e)—of an entity do not depend on other entities in the ranked list. In this section
we relax this assumption and analyze the implications. Since the nature of the
mutual influence may vary for different problems, we base our analysis on a specific
well known problem—ranking considering diversity [Carterette 2010; Agrawal et al.
2009; Rafiei et al. 2010].
Diversity ranking accounts for the fact that the utility of an entity is reduced by
the presence of a similar entity above in the ranked list. This is a typical example
of the mutual influence between the entities. All the existing objective functions
for the diversity ranking are known to be NP-Hard [Carterette 2010]. We analyze
a most basic form of diversity ranking to explain why this is a fundamentally hard
problem.
We modify the objective function in Equation 1 slightly to distinguish between
the stand-alone utilities and the residual utilities—utility of an entity in the context
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of other entities in the list—as,
E(U) =
N∑
i=1
Ur(ei)Pc(ei) (22)
where Ur(ei) denotes the residual utility.
We consider a simple case of diversity ranking problem by considering a set
of entities—all having the same utilities, perceived relevances and abandonment
probabilities. Some of these entities may be repeating. If an entity in the ranked
list is same as the entity in the list above, residual utility of that entity becomes
zero. In this case, it is intuitive that the optimal ranking is to place maximum
number of pair wise dissimilar entities in the top slots. The theorem below shows
that even in this simple case the optimal ranking is NP-Hard.
Theorem 6. Diversity ranking optimizing expected utility in Equation 22 is NP-
Hard.
Proof Sketch: The proof is by reduction from the independent set problem. See
Appendix A-6 for the complete proof. 2
Moreover, the proof by reduction from independent set problem has more severe
implications than NP-Hardness as shown in the following corollary,
Corollary 1. The constant approximation algorithm for ranking considering
diversity is hard.
Proof: The proof of NP-Hardness theorem above shows that the independent set
problem is a special case of diversity ranking. This implies that a constant ratio
approximation algorithm for the optimal diversity ranking would be a constant
ratio approximation algorithm for the independent set problem. Since constant
ratio approximation of the independent set is known to be hard (cf. Garey and
Johnson [Garey and Johnson 1976] and H˚astad [H˚astad 1996]) the corollary follows.
To define hard, in his landmark paper H˚astad proved that independent set cannot be
solved within n1− for  > 0 unless all problems in NP are solvable in probabilistic
polynomial time, which is widely believed to be not possible.3 2
This section shows that the optimal ranking considering mutual influences of
parameters is hard. We are leaving formulating approximation algorithms (not
necessarily constant ratio) for future research.
Beyond proving the intractability of mutual influence ranking, we believe that
intractability of the simple scenario here explains why all diversity rankings are
likely to be intractable. Further the proof based on the reduction from the well
explored independent set problem may help in adapting approximations algorithms
from graph theory.
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We approach the web ranking as a utility maximization based on user’s click model,
and derive the optimal ranking—namely CE ranking. The ranking is simple and
3This belief is almost as strong as the belief P 6= NP
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intuitive; and optimal (for the given utilities) considering perceived relevance and
abandonment probability of user behavior.
For specific assumptions on parameters, the ranking function reduces to a taxon-
omy of ranking functions in multiple ranking domains. The enumerated taxonomy
will help to decide optimal ranking for a specific user behavior. In addition, the
taxonomy shows that the existing document and ad ranking strategies are special
cases of the proposed ranking function under specific assumptions.
To apply CE ranking to ad auctions, we incorporate a second price based pric-
ing. The resulting CE mechanism has a Nash Equilibrium which simultaneously
optimizes search engine and advertiser revenues. CE mechanism is revenue domi-
nant over VCG for the same bid vectors, and has an equilibrium which is revenue
equivalent with the truthful equilibrium of VCG.
Finally, we relax the assumption of independence between entities in CE ranking
and consider diversity ranking. The ensuing analysis revels that diversity ranking
is an inherently hard problem; since even the basic formulations are NP-Hard with
unlikely constant ratio approximation algorithms.
Our previous simulation studies suggest significant improvement in profits by CE
ranking over existing ranking strategies [Balakrishnan and Kambhampati 2008]. As
a future research, assessing profits by CE mechanism on a large scale search engine
click log will quantify improvement in a real environment. Learning and prediction
of abandonment probability from click logs as well as by parametric learning are
interesting problems. The suggested ranking is optimal for other web ranking sce-
narios with similar click models—like products and friends recommendations—and
may be extended to these problems. Further, effective approximation schemes for
diversity ranking based on similarity with the independent set problem may be
investigated.
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APPENDIX
A-1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Consider results ei and ei+1 in positions i and i + 1 respectively. Let
µi = γ(ei) + C(ei) for notational convenience. The total expected utility from ei
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and ei+1 when ei is placed above ei+1 is
i−1∏
j=1
(1− µj) [U(ei)C(ei) + (1− µi)U(ei+1)C(ei+1)]
If the order of ei and ei+1 are inverted by placing ei above ei+1, the expected utility
from these entities will be,
i−1∏
j=1
(1− µj) [U(ei+1)C(ei+1) + (1− µi+1)U(ei)C(ei))]
Since utilities from all other results in the list will remain the same, the expected
utility of placing ei above ei+1 is greater than inverse placement iff
U(ei)C(ei) + (1− µi)U(ei+1)C(ei+1) ≥ U(ei+1)C(ei+1) + (1− µi+1)U(ei)C(ei)
m
U(ei)C(ei)
µi
≥ U(ei+1)C(ei+1)
µi+1
This means if entities are ranked in the descending order of U(e)C(e)C(e)+γ(e) any inversions
will reduce the profit. Otherwise ranking by U(e)C(e)C(e)+γ(e) is optimal.
A-2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that ai refers to ad in the position
i in the descending order of wibi.
CEi =
pici
µi
=
bi+1ci+1µi
µi+1ci
ci
µi
=
bi+1ci+1
µi+1
= wi+1bi+1
≥ wi+2bi+2 = CEi+1
A-3 Proof of Theorem 3
Let there are n advertisers. Without loss of generality, let us assume that advertisers
are indexed in the descending order of viciµi . We prove equilibrium in two steps.
Step 1: Prove that
wibi ≥ wi+1bi+1 (A-1)
Proof.
wibi =
bici
µi
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Expanding bi by Equation 19,
wibi = vici + (1− µi)bi+1ci+1
µi+1
= vici + (1− µi)wi+1bi+1
=
vici
µi
µi + (1− µi)wi+1bi+1
Notice that wibi is a convex linear combination of wi+1bi+1 and
vici
µi
. This means
that the value of wibi is in between (or equal to) the values of wi+1bi+1 and
vici
µi
.
Hence to prove that wibi ≥ wi+1bi+1 all we need to prove is that viciµi ≥ wi+1bi+1.
This inductive proof is given below.
Induction hypothesis: Assume that
∀i≥j vici
µi
≥ wi+1bi+1
Base case: Prove for i = N i.e. for the bottommost ad.
vN−1cN−1
µN−1
≥ wNbN
Assuming ∀i>Nbi = 0
wNbN = vNcN ≤ vNcN
µN
(as µN ≤ 1) ≤ vN−1cN−1
µN−1
(by the assumed order i.e. by viciµi )
Induction: Expanding wjbj by Equation 19,
wjbj =
vjcj
µj
µj + (1− µj)wj+1bj+1
wjbj is the convex linear combination, i.e
vjcj
µj
≥ wjbj ≥ wj+1bj+1, as we know that
vjcj
µj
≥ wj+1bj+1 by induction hypothesis. Consequently,
wjbj ≤ vjcj
µj
≤ vj−1cj−1
µj−1
(by the assumed order)
This completes the induction.
Since advertisers are ordered by wibi for pricing, the above proof says that the
pricing order is the same as the assumed order in this proof (i.e. ordering by viciµi ).
Consequently,
pi =
bi+1ci+1µi
µi+1ci
As corollary of Theorem 2 we know that CEi ≥ CEi+1.
In the second step we prove the envy free equilibrium using results in Step 1.
Step 2: No advertiser can increase his profit by changing his bids uni-
laterally
Proof of Envy Freeness to Advertisers Below. In the first step let us
prove that ad ai can not increase his profit by decreasing his bid to move to a
position j ≥ i below.
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Inductive hypothesis: Assume true for i ≤ j ≤ m.
Base Case: Trivially true for j = i.
Induction: Prove that the expected profit of ai at m + 1 is less or equal to the
expected profit of ai at i.
Let ρk denotes the amount paid by ai when he is at the position k. By inductive
hypothesis, the expected profit at m is less or equal to the expected profit at i.
So we just need to prove that the expected profit at m + 1 is less or equal to the
expected profit at m. i.e.
(vi − ρm)
(1− µi)
m∏
l=1
(1− µl) ≥ (vi − ρm+1)
(1− µi)
m+1∏
l=1
(1− µl)
Canceling the common terms,
vi − ρm ≥ (vi − ρm+1)(1− µm+1) (A-2)
ρm—the price charged to ai at position m—is based on the Equations 16 and 19.
Since the ai is moving downward, ai will occupy position m by shifting ad am
upwards. Hence the ad just below ai is am+1. Consequently, the price charged to
ai when it is at the m
th position is,
ρm =
bm+1cm+1µi
µm+1ci
=
µi
ci
[
vm+1cm+1 + (1− µm+1)bm+2cm+2
µm+2
]
Substituting for ρm and ρm+1 in Equation A-2,
vi−µi
ci
[
vm+1cm+1 + (1− µm+1)bm+2cm+2
µm+2
]
≥
(
vi − µi
ci
[
vm+2cm+2 +
(1− µm+2)bm+3cm+3
µm+3
])
(1−µm+1)
Simplifying, and multiplying both sides by −1
µi
ci
[
vm+1cm+1 + (1− µm+1)bm+2cm+2
µm+2
]
≤ viµm+1 + µi
ci
(1− µm+1)
[
vm+2cm+2+
(1− µm+2)bm+3cm+3
µm+3
]
Substituting by bm+2 from Equation 19 on RHS.
µi
ci
[
vm+1cm+1 + (1− µm+1)bm+2cm+2
µm+2
]
≤ viµm+1 + µi
ci
(1− µm+1)bm+2cm+2
µm+2
Canceling out the common terms on both sides,
µi
ci
vm+1cm+1 ≤ viµm+1
m
vm+1cm+1
µm+1
≤ vici
µi
Which is true by the assumed order as m ≥ i
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Inductive proof for m ≤ i is somewhat similar and enumerated below.
Inductive hypothesis: Assume true for j ≤ m.
Base Case: Trivially true for j = i.
Proof of Envy freeness to the ad one above . The case in which ai in-
crease his bid to move one position up i.e. to i − 1 is a special case and need to
be proved separately. In this case, by moving a single slot up, the index of the ad
below ai will change from i+1 to i−1 (a difference of two). For all other movements
of ai to a position one above or one below, the index of the advertisers below will
change only by one. Since the amount paid by ai depends on the ad below ai, this
case warrants a slightly different proof,
(vi − ρi)
i−1∏
l=1
(1− µl) ≥ (vi − ρm−1)
i−2∏
l=1
(1− µl)
m
(vi − ρi)(1− µi−1) ≥ vi − ρi−1
Expanding ρi is straight forward.To expand ρi−1, note that when ai has moved
upwards to i− 1, the ad just below ai is ai−1. Since ai−1 has not changed its bids,
the ρi−1 can be expanded as µici
[
vi−1ci−1 + (1− µi−1) biciµi
]
. Substituting for ρi and
ρi−1, (
vi − µi
ci
[
vi+1ci+1 + ≥ vi − µi
ci
[
vi−1ci−1 +
(1− µi+1)bi+2ci+2
µi+2
])
(1− µi−1) (1− µi−1)bici
µi
]
Simplifying and multiplying by −1
viµi−1 +
µi
ci
[
vi+1ci+1 + ≤ µi
ci
[
vi−1ci−1 + (1− µi−1)bici
µi
]
(1− µi+1)bi+2ci+2
µi+2
]
(1− µi−1)
Substituting bi+1 from Equation 19
viµi−1 +
µi
ci
bi+1ci+1
µi+1
(1− µi−1) ≤ µi
ci
[
vi−1ci−1 + (1− µi−1)bici
µi
]
m
viµi−1 +
µi
ci
(1− µi−1)bi+1ci+1
µi+1
≤ µivi−1ci−1
ci
+
µi
ci
(1− µi−1)bici
µi
We now prove that both the terms in RHS are greater or equal to the corresponding
terms in LHS separately.
viµi−1 ≤ µivi−1ci−1
ci
m
vici
µi
≤ vi−1ci−1
µi−1
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Which is true by our assumed order.
Similarly,
µi
ci
(1− µi−1)bi+1ci+1
µi+1
≤ µi
ci
(1− µi−1)bici
µi
m
bi+1ci+1
µi+1
≤ bici
µi
Which is true by Equation A-1 above. This completes the proof for this case.
Induction: Prove that the expected profit at m−1 is less or equal to the expected
profit at m. The proof is similar to the induction for the case m > i.
Proof. Base case is trivially true.
(vi − ρm)
m−1∏
l=1
(1− µl) ≥ (vi − ρm−1)
m−2∏
l=1
(1− µl)
Canceling common terms,
(vi − ρm)(1− µm−1) ≥ vi − ρm−1
In this case, note that ai is moving upwards. This means that ai will occupy
position m by pushing the ad originally at m one position downwards. Hence the
original ad at m is the one just below ai now. i.e.
ρm =
bmcmµi
µmci
=
µi
ci
[
vmcm + (1− µm)bm+1cm+1
µm+1
]
Substituting for ρm and ρm−1(
vi − µi
ci
[
vmcm + ≥ vi − µi
ci
[
vm−1cm−1 +
(1− µm)bm+1cm+1
µm+1
])
(1− µm−1) (1− µm−1)bmcm
µm
]
Simplifying and multiplying by −1
viµm−1 +
µi
ci
[
vmcm + ≤ µi
ci
[
vm−1cm−1 + (1− µm−1)bmcm
µm
]
(1− µm)bm+1cm+1
µm+1
]
(1− µm−1)
Substituting by bm from Equation 19
viµm−1 +
µi
ci
bmcm
µm
(1− µm−1) ≤ µi
ci
[
vm−1cm−1 + (1− µm−1)bmcm
µm
]
Canceling common terms,
viµm−1 ≤ µi
ci
vm−1cm−1
m
vici
µi
≤ vm−1cm−1
µm−1
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Which is true by the assumed order as m < i.
A-4 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. VCG payment of the ad at position i (i.e. ai) is equal to the reduction
in utility of the ads below due to the presence of ai. For each user viewing the list
of ads (i.e. for unit view probability), the total expected loss of ads below ai due
to ai is,
pVui =
1
1− µi
n∑
j=i+1
bjcj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− µk)−
n∑
j=i+1
bjcj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− µk)
=
µi
1− µi
n∑
j=i+1
bjcj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− µk)
=
µi
1− µi
i∏
k=1
(1− µk)
n∑
j=i+1
bjcj
j−1∏
k=i+1
(1− µk)
= µi
i−1∏
k=1
(1− µk)
n∑
j=i+1
bjcj
j−1∏
k=i+1
(1− µk)
This is the expected lose per user browsing the ad list. Pay per click should be
equal to the lose per click. To calculate the pay per click, we divide by the click
probability of ai. i.e.
pVi =
µi
∏i−1
k=1(1− µk)
∑n
j=i+1 bjcj
∏j−1
k=i+1(1− µk)
ci
∏i−1
k=1(1− µk)
=
µi
ci
n∑
j=i+1
bjcj
j−1∏
k=i+1
(1− µk)
Converting to recursive form,
pVi =
bi+1µi
ci
ci+1 + (1− µi+1)µici+1
ciµi+1
pVi+1
=
bi+1µici+1
ciµi+1
µi+1 + (1− µi+1)µici+1
ciµi+1
pVi+1 (A-3)
For the CE mechanism payment from Equation 16 is,
pCEi =
bi+1ci+1µi
µi+1ci
Note that pVi is convex combination of P
CE
i and
µici+1
ciµi+1
pVi+1, and hence is between
these two values. To prove that pCEi ≥ pVi all we need to prove is that PCEi ≥
µici+1
ciµi+1
pVi+1 ⇔ bi ≥ pVi . This directly follows from individual rationality property of
VCG. Alternatively, a simple recursion with base case as pVN = 0 (bottommost ad)
will prove the same. Note that we consider only the ranking (not selection), and
hence the VCG pricing of the bottommost ad in the ranking is zero.
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A-5 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Rearranging Equation A-3 and substituting true values for bid amounts,
pVi =
µi
ci
[
vi+1ci+1 +
(1− µi+1)ci+1
µi+1
pVi+1
]
For the CE mechanism, substituting equilibrium bids from Equation 19 in payment
(Equation 16),
pCEi =
bi+1ci+1µi
µi+1ci
=
µi
ci
[
vi+1ci+1 + (1− µi+1)bi+2ci+2
µi+2
]
Rewriting bi+2 in terms of pi+1,
pCEi =
µi
ci
[
vi+1ci+1 +
(1− µi+1)ci+1
µi+1
pCEi+1
]
= pVi (iff p
V
i+1 = p
CE
i+1)
Ad at the bottommost position pays same amount zero, a simple recursion will prove
that the payment for all positions for both VCG and the proposed equilibrium is
the same.
A-6 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Independent set problem can be formulated as a ranking problem con-
sidering similarities. Consider an unweighed graph G of n vertices {e1, e2, ..en}
represented as an adjacency matrix. This conversion is clearly polynomial time.
Now, consider the values in the adjacency matrix as the similarity values between
the entities to be ranked. Let the entities have the same utilities, perceive rele-
vances and abandonment probabilities. In this set of n entities from {e1, e2, .., en},
clearly the optimal ranking will have k pairwise independent entities as the top k
entities for a maximum possible value of k. But the set of k independent entities
corresponds to the maximum independent set in graph G.
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